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ABSTRACT 
 
The cyber security research realm is plagued with the problem of collecting and using 
trace data from sources.  Methods of anonymizing public data sets have been proven to leak 
large amounts of private network data.  Yet access to private and public trace data is needed, 
this is the problem that NEMESIS seeks to solve. 
 NEMESIS is a virtual network system level solution to the problem where instead of 
bringing the data to the experiments one brings the experiments to the data.  NEMESIS 
provides security and isolation that other approaches have not; allowing for filtering and 
anonymization of trace data as needed.  
 The solution came about from a desire and need to have a system level solution that 
leveraged and allowed for the usages of the best current technologies, while remaining highly 
extendible to future needs.
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
The NEMESIS idea came about from the research that is being conducted at Iowa 
State University and the needs of other researchers. The computer security and networking 
fields currently have a problem that is persisting.  The problem is that of using research data 
sets.  There are not a lot of public data sets and those that are in existence are designed for a 
particular problem.  If researchers are looking to test a new anomaly based intrusion 
detection system, the researcher would need a current data set and multiple data sets over a 
period of time from an enterprise network.  Problems persist trying to get this type of trace 
data from enterprise networks.   
Most enterprise networks don’t want information about their internal network to 
make it to the outside of their network.  That information is private and they want to protect 
it, in fact most have security policies preventing that information from leaving the network. 
In this case the organization might allow for a private trace to be collected on a limited 
segment of their network, and then allow the researcher access to that trace and the 
researcher’s results could be public but the trace would be private and not allowed to be 
shared or examined.  Another common option is public sanitized data sets, this where an 
organization has released data to the research community but has sanitized and anonymized 
the data.  Both choices have their own problems. 
Private data sets can be hard to negotiate for, and then the results, since the data set is 
private cannot be verified by another researcher.  That is to say that another researcher cannot 
run his tests on the same data set to verify that what is identified is in the trace.  Sanitization 
is not a complete solution and allows for many different kinds of attacks, and data leakage.  
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This paper will explain some of the attacks on anonymized network data, and how allowing 
the release of anonymized network data can leak sensitive private information about the 
network or individual users.   
1.1. NEMESIS 
NEMESIS, Network Experimentation and Monitoring in Environments Safely In-
Situ, solution is a systems level approach to the problem of using and collecting network 
trace data that allows for in place experiments to be run.  This solution takes the experiments 
to the trace data owner; instead bring the trace data to the experiment, allowing for the trace 
data owner to have more control over what information gets release and give some added 
protection against future attacks on the released network traces since no network traces are 
released.  In figure 1 below a big picture view of NEMESIS is presented.  NEMESIS consists 
of multiple parts.  There is a Virtual Framework peace and a policy management peace that is 
used to control and implement policies on the virtual framework system.  This paper address 
the virtual framework system and makes suggestions at some of the tools for implementing 
some of the policies.  This paper does not discuss in detail or address how the policy 
management system should be implemented.  For the policy management in the paper the 
network monitoring policies are implemented by the use of software firewalls since standard 
networking is used to control data flow between host and virtual machine.  The policy 
management will need to be implemented with the given data flow and control piece.  This 
paper proposes one possible implementation of the NEMESIS idea with virtual machines and 
the use of existing virtual network technologies.   
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Figure 1. NEMESIS node 
 
A quick overview of the process and to aid in explaining the NEMESIS idea is figure 
2 is a conceptual drawing of process flow.  The three columns represent the 3 actors that we 
wish to collaborate during the experiment.  The researcher has an idea and then a design is 
worked out with a developer.  The researcher and the trace owner negotiate privacy concerns 
reach an agreement, and then development beings.  Development and local testing begin 
since once the experiment is deployed the trace owner the researcher will only get the results 
back.  The virtual machine that was developed is deployed to the trace owners NEMESIS 
node and the experiment begins, and runs autonomously.  When the experiment ends, the 
result are analyzed and if they meet the agreed upon terms, they are released to the researcher 
for publication.   
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Figure 2. Collaboration example (by Thomas E. Daniels PHD) 
 
NEMESIS utilizes virtual machines to leverage the existing technologies and allows 
for multiple experiments to be run on the same hardware, reducing the server footprint on an 
enterprise network and allowing researchers to build their experiment with the tools they 
want to use and not through a custom programming or query language.  This would allow 
form multiple tools to be run like snort (a common Intrusion Detection System) and custom 
tools and correlate the results.  For the data that is sent back to the researcher.   
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CHAPTER 2.  BACKGROUND 
There are many solutions to the problem of dealing with trace data.  The solutions 
range from anonymization to custom languages.  This section will address the previous 
solution, their failures, and the need for a complete solution.  This section will discuss the 
core components of NEMESIS. 
Anonymization and sanitization of trace data, was the first solution purposed and is 
still seen as the front running solution.    Anonymization allows for the protection of private 
network information.  Packet body’s can be sanitized or removed, IP address can be mapped 
to new IP address.  There are three main ways to do anonymization Partial, Full, and N-Flow 
anonymization.  Recent work has proven that removing payloads and host IP address does 
not alone protect the privacy of the trace.  [Brekne 14] 
Partial or pseudo anonymization involves some preservation, where as subnets would 
be preserved, however changed.  So the octets would be the same for any address coming 
from that octet. For example 123.0.0.0 would map to 444.X.X.X, and 123.1.0.0 would map 
to 444.340.X.X.   In some cases such as Crypto-PAn cryptographic methods are used to 
anonymize the trace data.  These methods are subject to cryptographic attacks on the 
algorithm. [Brekne 14]  Full anonymization is when the IP address fields are randomized and 
the payload is stripped.  When this is done the data set becomes less useful to researchers. 
[Mirkovic 13]  
 TCPdpriv is a tool that executes on tcpdump trace files and performs anonymization 
on these files.  TCPdpriv removes sensitive information by operating only packet headers the 
payload is fully removed.  TCPdpriv can do full stripping, prefix-preserving psedo-
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anonymization of network trace preserving topology for the researcher incase this is needed 
for the results.  While running TCPdpriv maintains a list of IP address mappings in memory. 
Crypto-PAn is a tool much like TCPdpriv allowing for one-to-one maps between IP 
address in source and result trace and prefix preserving.  Because Crypto-PAn is based on 
cryptographic methods using a key to determine the mapping, as long as the same key is used 
the same mapping can persist across multiple sessions.  The tool is based on Rijndael cipher 
for cryptography. [Fan 9]  Crypto-Pan only works on IP address s and the 8 most common 
fields of NetFlows, since releasing NetFlows is better than releasing full traces.       
Anonymization is a balance between trace owner privacy and effectiveness of the 
trace to researchers.  This is a problem since there are a number of attacks on anonymized 
traces.  The attacks are passive and active.  Passive attacks are those that take the public trace 
data and other public data to infer private data.  Active attacks are those that involve doing 
something while the trace is being collected that can be identified and used to break the 
privacy of the trace.  [Mirkovic 13] 
A passive attack example would be using packet length field to identify what 
websites a particular host has visited.   This can be done when all replays are observed within 
one tcp connection or a summarized Net Flow.  The use of ARP data, subnet clustering and 
publicly available DNS records can be used to get network topologies, determine observation 
points, and some host matching [Coull 1]. 
Active attacks include injecting data in at the time of capture that can be pulled out in 
the public trace and used to break the anonymization.  To do this one would spoof source and 
destination address and then make the header or traffic flow pattern identifiable in the trace 
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so that the information can be pulled out later.  Details are given in [Brekne 14] on who to do 
injections and active attacks.   
The next solution presented to the problem of using private trace data, while 
preserving the data.  This solution relates in many, but limited ways to the solution that this 
paper purposes.  In 2006 at SIGCOMM’06 workshop, SC2D was presented.  SC2D is a 
framework and programming language designed and proposed as a way of bringing research 
to the data.  Instead of getting the data trace from an organization and running tests on that 
trace.  SC2D purposed that the data remain at the organization and that they have a server, 
which the experiments are run on.  This approach utilizes a modular interpretive language.  
The researcher would develop a module that then would be run and the results returned to the 
researcher.  The framework handles anonymization at a lower abstraction level than what the 
user programs in.  The paper also outlines process for code review, although never tried.  The 
prototype was based and written in BRO IDS, and had performance issues and management 
of multiple project issues.  Conclusion: this a tool in which researchers write their tests in the 
framework and interpretive language and get the results sent back to them.  However if their 
result rely on correlation of data from existing tools and their tool, the researcher would need 
something more to be able to get the results they are looking for. {Mogul 5] 
The next paper and work that this paper addresses is using secure quarries to query 
trace data preserving privacy.  Although Mirkovic was not the first to suggest secure queries, 
she presented the idea of dealing with the privacy concerns in the query language and 
database.  The system works by imputing the trace data into a database, then the researchers 
write their programs to query the data or run off the returned data from the queries.  The 
query language restricts queries on some data fields and some contexts.  Results returned 
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from this purposed solution are not raw packets but aggregate data.   The advantage of this 
system over anonymized trace data lays in fine grained controls and control over the portal to 
access data.  The Portal controls can monitor usage patterns and control if a user is using 
multiple queries to get at information that when correlated would reveal privacy-sensitive 
information.  This solution has not been prototyped. 
No single prevented solution is enough and is a perfect solution.  My solution is not 
perfect either; however it is a complete solution with the ability to be expanded for future 
needs of researchers. 
Virtualization and virtual machines has been seen as a way to run multiple servers on 
the physical hardware of one server, since space is a comity in a server farm, and server 
generally don’t use all their resources.    Virtualization also can add another level of security 
features, first the servers can have images made of them at a given state and restored if a 
problem occurs.  Virtualization also adds a layer of protection since there is either a 
hypervisor or host OS (DOM 0).  So in order to make system calls all commands go through 
the hypervisor.  All normal security percussion must still be kept and the physical device, 
hypervisor or DOM 0 must still be hardened.  The solution proposed in this thesis can be 
implanted with either a DOM 0 or a hypervisor approach.  Though the implantations very 
some.  With virtual machines the physical device still can control the network adapter and 
thus the traffic seen or allowed out of any VM can be controlled allowing for firewall in front 
of every Virtual machine that is not located on the virtual machine.  Thus each server can 
have custom rules in place on the DOM 0, while the DOM 0, could see all traffic going to 
any VM.   Virtualization can be used to help with the security in depth model.  In the cpirse 
of this project’s research KVM a DOM 0 approach, and VMWare ESXi a hypervisor 
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approach were examined. The main difference between a DOM 0 and a hypervisor approach 
is how resources are managed and allocated.  The figure 2 shows how a virtual machine 
manager works.  The virtual machine manager passes and controls the access to the physical 
hardware.     
 
Figure 3. How a virtual machine manager works 
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CHAPTER 3. IMPLAMANATION AND DESIGN 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the design and implementation of NEMESIS.  It looks at the 
design goals and constraints of existing technologies, how some technologies presented 
unique problems, how those challenges were, overcome or a proposed solution that will be 
future explained in future work.  Also a process flow is suggested on how to use the proposed 
solution with a breakdown of the steps in the process flow.     
3.2 Core design components 
The core pieces to the design approach are a Virtual Network infrastructure, 
communication interface, Policy management and enforcement. 
3.2.1 Virtual network infrastructure 
Hypervisor, a term that finds it roots in mainframes is software that allows multiple 
host Operating System(OS)  to run on the same physical hardware also referred to as virtual 
machine monitor (VMM).  Two types of VMM exist the first type is that which runs directly 
on the hardware the second runs in a host OS often referred to as DOM 0 or host OS with 
Virtual machines being referred to as guest OS.  As mentioned in the previous section both 
types could be used to complete this project.  The design constraints and needs of the VMM 
for this project were simple, The VMM needs to be able to run multiple VM experiments at 
the same time, be highly extendible to future needs and be useable, capable of running 
multiple different OS from Linux to UNIX to Windows.   The VMM must be able to separate 
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the privileges of one VM from another.  There needs to be a way of pulling results off of the 
VMs from the host OS or have results pushed from VM to Host OS. 
Hypervisor type 2 was selected since it allows for better use of current existing 
technologies running on the host OS and allowed for us of open source technologies that 
could be expanded or customized in the future for implementations.  Running a VMM on a 
host OS allows for tools to be written in kernel or user space to help with the management or 
expansion of the solution. 
The VMM that was select was Kernel-Based Virtual Machine KVM.  KVM is a 
derivative of  KQEMU which is QEMU accelerator that provides a way to run user mode 
code on the host CPU and some Kernel code on the Host CPU rather than the emulated CPU.  
KVM utilizes the Intel and AMD CPU virtualization support designed into the micro 
processor to do some optimization, and it does allow for privately virtualized NICS, hard 
drives.   
One of the most important factors in choosing a type 2 VMM is the ability to pull 
results off the VM once the VM has been stopped running.  With KVM this can be done in 
multiple ways the first way which is what we outline is to have the VMs create a folder in the 
root directory of the VM disk image called results.  The VM writes its results to this folder, 
when the VM experiment is completed and the VM is shutdown then the Host OS can mount 
the disk image as a directory and copy off the results folder to its own results patrician, where 
the results can be analyzed, and thus allowing for a fully autonomous process in the future.  
The second  possibility is for the Host OS  to create a disk image, that is limited in size and 
then the guest OS mounts this virtual disk and write results to this patrician which are later 
copied off as describe in possibility one.  This paper recommends solution 2 since it utilizes 
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solution one with adding overall size constraints on the results set.  Which is determined to 
be a problem can be addressed by using a policy, which limits results to the remaining space 
of the guest OS virtual machine as agreed upon in policy discussions of the experiment.  
Figure 3 below shows a disk level view of the solution and how the results could be written. 
 
Figure 4.  Disk level view of virtual machine infrastructure  
 
3.2.2 Communication infrastructure 
Once KVM was selected as the VMM the next step was to determine how the trace 
data or network traffic would get to the VMs.  The obvious choice would be to use virtual 
network interfaces, for a prototype this is a possibility, however some fine grained filtering 
and packet alteration, might need something more in the future.  The design issues for the 
communication interface stems from the idea of having multiple VM running on the same 
physical hardware.  Each virtual machine needs to be able to receive different traffic or 
different portions of traffic.  Adding a custom kernel device might be a better choice down 
the road than using the standard virtual network interface.  KVM uses tun/tap devices which 
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are virtual Ethernet devices; a tun device only functions at the IP layer and not the full 
Ethernet layer where as a tap device functions at the full Ethernet layer.  When creating the 
virtual interface for the VMs one would need to create tap devices since the full Ethernet 
headers are needed.   In testing it was show that if a tun device is used even if a bridge is in 
promisc mode, so thus acting as a hub, since a tun device is a layer 3 IP device it functions as 
a switch only accepting traffic bound for the other side of the tun interface.  Interestingly 
enough the tool used to make static tun/tap interfaces, tunctl, by default is set to create tap 
interfaces.  However, the Debian package that contains tunctl is UML-tools and it is 
compiled to create tun devices only.  On a Debian machine one must compile tunctl from 
source, on a Fedora machine there is a RPM for tunctl that works fine.   
Once you understand how to create and make virtual interfaces, and bind them to a 
VM it is important to understand the other network tools that will help build a virtual 
network and firewall the interface so that the experimental VM do not send any traffic out in 
the instances that they may be bridged to a real network interface for a direct network tap.   
 There are two different potential types of trace data that could need to reach the VMs.  
The first potential would be live trace data.  The virtual interface is bridge directly to a real 
interface, or bridged to a virtual interface that is bridged to a real interface.  In this Case the 
Trace data would need to within reason and reliable with expectable packet lose get to the 
Guest OS’s virtual interface.  The tool in Linux that is used to make static bridges is “brctrl.” 
Technical details on how bridge control will work are given in appendix A.  The basic tools 
that can be used in Linux to filter on a bride are known as ebtables.  They function the same 
way that iptables function in Linux as basic firewall rules filtering on port, ipaddress, 
protocol. In some cases when listening on a tap point on a network the port the interface that 
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is being forward to the VM is connect to a Network TAP and can only receive on side of the 
conversation.  In this case two taps would be need one listening on each side of the 
conversation and the two trace would have to be reassemble much the same way Paxson did 
with the data collected at LBNL [Paxson 21].    Figure 4 shows an example network view of 
a NEMESIS running on live network data. 
Ebtables or bsd bridged-firewall
hub
Vm(1)
Vm(…)
Vm(n)
No
Yes
Network View
Internal NEMESIS Node network
NEMESIS Node
 
Figure 5. NEMESIS live network data view 
 
In the instance where a network trace is present, and not live trace data. When using 
virtual network interface to transport recorded trace data from host to client machine one 
15 
 
could use TCPReplay to replay the recorded trace on the host OS directly on the virtual 
interface of the guest OS running the experiment.  This would allow for the trace data to be 
recorded in advance and then feed through anonymizers, such as Crypto-PAn before being 
played to the VM if one is still concerned about privacy leakage.  Figure 5 shows NEMESIS 
running on recorded sanitized network data.    
Ebtables or bsd bridged-firewall
hub
Vm(1)
Vm(n)
No
Yes
External Network View
Trace Data
Function on trace data Sanitized 
trace data
Sanitized 
trace data
TCPReplay
Network Trace Sanitization Function
Physical Server Internal Network View
 
Figure 6. NEMESIS with sanitized data being replayed to the virtual machines 
 
 Problems that must be discussed with the use of virtual network interface as the 
primary way of moving trace data between host and guest OS for the purposes of test.  When 
a virtual interface receives a packet a context switch is requested to handle that packet.  
Packets are queued however some packets are lost during context switches in observation 
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there was observed packet lose, however it was limited and but further testing would be need 
for a conclusion on using virtual interfaces in a production environment.  A suggested 
optional replacement was a kernel module that handles the networking and queuing of 
packets.  The second replacement option would be Ethernet-over-IP this would encapsulates 
the Ethernet frames in IP frames and transmit the request frame to a given guest OS.  In this 
case a module might need to be written to filter or handle the different frames going to 
multiple VM on the same bridge or cloning of packets so that they could be forwarded to 
different experiments.  
3.2.3 Policy management and enforcement  
Policy management and enforcement has multiple steps.  An organization that owns 
the trace data thus forth referred to as the owner, will have policy regarding privacy and 
sensitive information leaving the organization’s network.  An example might be that 
internally sending SSN is expectable but they are not to be sent out of the network.  Another 
example might be that no information containing information about the internal network 
topology and sub netting scheme should be release to the general public.   
Organization have developed policies on what information can leave their network 
and most likely will have policies on what machine can be brought on to their network, 
virtual or physical.  The organization must also examine what information they are willing to 
allow a research experiment access to on their network.  This might vary from a standard 
machine on their network, since the creator and end user of the machine is not an employee 
of the organization.  This is where anonymization has traditionally come into play.  There 
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would be detailed discussions on policy between the researcher and the organization on what 
they would be willing to expose and what they would want to have sanitized.   
One of the design goals of moving the experiment to the trace owner instead of bring 
the trace to the experiment is that this discussion would be minimized.  Instead of completely 
sanitizing the trace, to a point where it could have impact on the results.  The policies can be 
enforced on the data that leaves the trace owner.  The results returned from the experiment 
can be where the policies are enforced.   It is the hope that in the future that the policy 
enforcement can be automated, but in this prototype it is done by human interaction by 
examination of the results.  Trust is a common problem with all trace data collection and 
usage solutions.  It is a problem here, if there is noise in a system than there is room for a 
covert channel.  When the results are returned to the research sensitive information could be 
released in carefully crafted results.  This would be an example of an active attack on the 
virtual infrastructure system.  Much like packet injection works on anonymization solutions 
if one injects data into the results it is almost undetectable due to noise.  However this can be 
minimized based on the noise in the data results that are agreed upon.  If the results are a 
comma delimited file of alerts returned or simple numbers that represent data points, there is 
some noise there, however, if the results are number of events and counts, aggregate the risk 
could be reduced.   
3.3 Process for a research experiment 
This subsection outlines the process flow that a typical research would go through 
with an organization using this solution.  The following Figure 6 is an overview that will be 
broken down of the process flow.
  
 
 
Figure 7. Process diagram
18 
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3.3.1 Initial contact and agreement 
Organizations need to develop polices about network traffic.  Organizations need to 
have security and privacy policies.  Having the policy in place helps to know what do in a 
circumstance when an incident occurs on the network.  These policies would help to govern 
the discussions on what data the experiments and research would be privy to for the 
experiments.  Policies should be discussed at all levels of management and with legal taking 
in the concerns of the security and networking teams.   
Researchers start with a problem or a question to be addressed.  Once they have a 
question and determine that they need trace data for their solution.  The data may be needed 
for testing or comparison.  The research needs to see if a publically available data set exists 
that they can use, if there is a set they should do testing with that data, set while looking for 
an organization that has the NEMESIS node in place.  Once an organization is identified the 
researcher would write up their needs for the data, types of data, results and research question 
they want to address and begin a dialogue with this information with the organization.  The 
organization is going to need detail to determine if they can help the researcher.   
Negotiations between the researchers and the organization now begin.  Up until this 
point the organization has agreed that they could help but not the specifics of the data that 
they will be able to expose to the researchers.  The organization knows the research problem, 
needs, and desires of the researchers.  The organization then evaluates this against the 
predetermined policies, and what results they can allow out of the network.  The organization 
must evaluate what trace and network data they can allow the researchers to see.  Then they 
must determine what results can leave there network.   What is an acceptable risk, if the 
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results returned can simply be aggregate data?  By controlling what results leave the network 
the organization can make an effort to prevent future attacks on the results.  When a network 
trace is released to the public anonymized or not there is no way to prevent against future 
new attacks.  This is best observed by the example of Pang’s attacks on the data that Paxson 
collect at LBNL [LBNL 21].   The discussions will go back and forth until an agreement is 
made or it is determined that the needs of the researcher cannot be met by the organization 
due to policy or data leak concerns.  
3.3.2 Virtual machine creation and deployment 
At this stage in the research process an agreement has been reached, and now 
development on the test VM can begin.  While a scheduled test date has already been agreed 
upon the experiment VM must be built since size, traffic, result, memory, and CPU 
limitations will all have been outlined.  These are all needed when constructing the virtual 
machines to understand performance needs, disk space and memory limitations so that way 
in the middle of the experiment the VM doesn’t have to constantly be paging out memory or 
be pegging the CPU.  For example if the VM was to use snort and it had limited memory the 
research may need to turn on the “lowmen” flag.  The VM must also be able to complete 
itself write data to the results directory by the stop date, and be autonomous since it will be 
started and have no interaction other then booted once it leaves the researcher and is sent to 
the organization.  Since the VM will be autonomous there will need to be extensive testing 
complete on the part of the research.  By using all open source tools the researcher can create 
a test network to mimic the organization and thus minimize all integration concerns.  The 
VM shall be sent with its start script since in some cases the start scripts can be long.  Some 
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parts of the script will be defined by the organization, since the organization will most likely 
want the device to have the n graphics option enabled.  This option simple removes the x 
display mapping of the VMs display; included in appendix B is the man pages for KVM 
along with all the start options.   
3.3.3 Collecting results from the experiment virtual machine  
Before the scheduled shutdown time for the VM it should write its results to the 
results segment on disk as agreed upon in the agreement stage discussed earlier.  The results 
are then pulled off the VM and moved on to the Host OS.  Once on the host OS the results 
can be compared against the agreed upon policies and the experiment VM and disks can be 
zeroed and removed.  Tools can be ran on the results to detect pattern matching, whether 
internal network IP schemes are being leaked, raw trace data is being released through the 
results, unsanitized logs with raw trace data contained are being released, network 
vulnerabilities, basically any information other than what is agreed upon. If the agreed upon 
results carry a lot of noise then there would be room for a covert channel   this exists in al 
systems, including sanitization.   
If the results are found to b in violation of the agreed upon contract they are not 
released.  At this stage it might become obvious to the organization that there was a 
misunderstanding or an assumption made that was to explicitly stated, and thus the results 
leak information that the organization does not want to leave its network.  In either case the 
results would not be released the problems with the results sets would be brought up directly 
with the researcher.  Some of the issues may have simply been a misunderstanding, or the 
results were not formatted correctly and the researcher may be given a chance to fix the VM 
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and the experiment rescheduled.   It might be that the researcher thought that they could get a 
little bit extra data, in which case the organization may feel a trust violation has occurred and 
scrap the experiment and future work with the researcher. Another possibility is that for one 
reason or another the results were not written to the results section. 
If the results were not written then the researcher would be notified that there was a 
problem with the VM and that the results were not where they were expected to be.  The 
researcher would be given the opportunity to see if they had a similar error in there local test 
and given a chance to fix it and reschedule.  If the VM crashed it would be rescheduled to run 
later when there is an opening on the server for experiments.  The researcher would still be 
notified of the failed attempt.   
If the results contain no extra data, meet policy, and are formatted as agreed upon, 
they are released to the researcher.  The results are than analyzed and evaluated and added to 
the research paper which is then published. 
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CHAPTER 4.  TEST SETUP 
There has been a base system implemented with a larger test run scheduled for IT 
Olympics 2009 at Iowa State University.  The test system includes a host server and then 
multiple experiment VM running at the same time.  The test system host setup will be 
described followed by the preliminary test and then the scheduled full feature test.   
4.1 Host System  
The test system is a dell PowerEdge1950 with an Intel Xeone5345 quad core 
processors, 2 sata 7200 rpm 160 gb hard disks, 4 Gb RAM, and 3 1000/100/10 network 
adapters.  The processor supports Intel’s virtualization instructions so can be used in 
conjunction with KVM as a Virtual machine manager.  This system will function for the tests 
and be able to handle all the test situations.   
4.1.1 Operating system 
The Operating selected was Debian based Ubuntu Server 8.10 this was choose due to 
implementer familiarity with the operating system.  Debian is a Linux distribution that has a 
KVM port. The other choose would have been to use Fedora, but with the ease of use of 
Ubuntu and its fast growing user base, future researchers may have more familiarity with 
Ubuntu since it primarily used KVM and Qemu as VMM over Red Hat and Fedora using 
XEN, until recently.  During installation the Virtualization option was not selected and KVM 
was not installed.  If this option is not installed at installation it can be installed by “sudo apt-
get install KVM.” Other packages that needed to be installed are  uml-tools, build-essentials, 
gcc, g++, python, brctl, and ebtables. Because UML-tools in Debian installs a version of 
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tunctl that only creates tun device and not tap devices as discussed earlier, one needs to 
download the source code for tunctl and build the tool.   Once the tool has been built it needs 
mv so that it replaces the currently installed version in /sbin.     
4.2 Alpha test 
The Alpha Test was limited in its scope testing the core most functionality of project.  
The alpha test was performed during a Cyber Defense Competition at Iowa State University.  
The test consisted of two experiment VMs and no filtering. Due to design complications 
prior to the test a different test solution was used.  The alternate solution involved using VM-
Ware ESXi and carefully assigned virtual switches to simulate the environment of the 
original test system with bridged network interfaces.  The challenges that were seen during 
this test were resolved two days after the test was ran.  The challenges steamed from the 
default UML-tools installation of tunctl only creating tun devices and thus forcing the 
bridges that were in promisc mode to function as switches since the interface that were bound 
to the bridges were IP devices and not Ethernet devices, so only traffic bound for the virtual 
interface would reach the virtual interface and not all traffic. 
4.2.1 Network for alpha test 
The network for the alpha is similar to the network for the Full feature test only fewer 
systems were online for the test.  Figure 7 below shows a view of the network and where the 
Host Os server was listening and thus where the experiment virtual machines were listening.  
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Figure 8. Alpha test network 
 
Blue teams (defense) networks had a ftp, web, rdp, and cvs server running on the 
networks.  There were approximately 14 blue team networks each with its own IP range and 
network traffic.  All out bound and inbound traffic to a team’s network got routed through 
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the ISEAGE Internet Scale Event Attack Generation Environment cluster, and then copies of 
those packets were dumped out to a hub in which the tap interface of the Host Server was 
listening on.     
Red teams (attack) network consist of many different IP address ranges in which any 
machine connected to the network can acquire an address in any of the provided IP ranges.  
This is the attacker’s network, where all official attacks on the Blue teams should come from.  
All out bound and inbound traffic to the red team network get routed through the ISEAGE 
cluster, to the appropriate location and then copies of those packets were dumped out to a 
hub in which the tap interface of the Host Server was listening on. 
The Green (everyday users) network is to simulate users that access services from 
outside the firewall of a team.  All traffic is routed through ISEAGE and a copy of the traffic 
is based out to the hub that the Host Server is listening on.   
All Contest traffic is copied and then seen by the host server for the experiment VMs 
to run their tools on.       
4.2.2 Virtual machines for alpha test 
The Alpha test consisted of two virtual machines; each virtual machine network 
interface was bridged to the host machines network interface that is listening at the TAP 
point.  There was no ebtables in place; this test was to look at the performance and packet 
loss and to test whether or not the traffic is seen by the VMs.  So in this test it appears as if 
both experiment VMs are directly listening on the tap interface. 
Experiment Virtual Machine 1 was designed to test the ability to run snort on a 
Virtual machine since during an attack multiple snort alerts should be generated.  Due to the 
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RAM constraints of the virtual machine being set to 512 megs of RAM, the “lowmem” 
option of snort need to be enabled.  This was a testing the ability to generate results and then 
copy them to a results section of the VM to be pulled off.  The virtual machine operating 
system was Ubuntu 8.10 server with as few features installed as possible.   Snort was then 
installed and configured start at boot and listen on the virtual machines network interface.  
Then the Virtual machines network device was configured statically to have no IP address 
and be in promisc mode.  In this mode the interface listens to all inbound traffic.  Then a 
CRON  job (a command to be executed at an assigned time) was added to copy the snort log 
file from its default directory to /results directory on disc 30 minutes after the contest was 
scheduled to end.  This way the researcher could follow the procedure set forth to remove the 
results and analyze them.   
Experiment virtual machine 2 was designed to test the performance of the system and 
check the amount of packet lose between host network adapter and virtual machine network 
adapter.  The contest ran for 8 hours with high and low bandwidth peaks so the packet lose 
percentage over that time frame would give an idea of the amount of packet lose to expect in 
the system.  The virtual machine was a simple Ubuntu 8.10 server install.  At boot the 
machine was scheduled to write the packet count seen by the interface to a file.  Then 30 
minutes after the contest was scheduled to end it was to append the packet count seen by the 
interface to the same file written earlier in the results section on disk. 
4.2.3 Results for alpha test 
Results of the experiment virtual machines in the test were varied.  Virtual machine 1 
results worked.  The snort log detected 451 events varying from scans to web server directory 
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traversal.  The results were written to disk and the script in appendix C was used mount the 
virtual disk on the host OS and then to copy the results folder from the virtual machine disk 
to the host OS where the results were analyzed.  Virtual Machine 2 however did not work out 
so well.  The results file showed 0 as the first entry written into the file at boot since the 
interface had yet to see any packets.  That was the only line in the file, it never wrote the last 
entry into the file.  It was determined the virtual machines system clock was not accurately 
set so that the CRON job used to write the total number of packets seen by the interface after 
the competition was over never ran.  The lesson learned for future researcher is to check that 
the system clock is accurately set.    
4.2.4 Test system fix for alpha test 
After the contest was complete and before the network was fully taken offline the 
problem with the original test system setup was determined to be a custom compiled version 
of tunctl.  After compiling from source the following WireShark screenshot was taken.  
Figure 8 is the WireShark image, and it shows that the problem was resolved with a source 
compile. 
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Figure 10.  Virtual network configuration for Figure 6 
 
4.3 Full feature beta test 
The Beta test is to test most of the feature of the proposed system.  The propose 
original host operating system setup will be used.  The Beta test will be conducted at IT 
Olympics on April 20th-21st.  The test shall consist of 4 virtual machines, the host box will be 
running a WireShark window to keep track of all packet reaching virtual interfaces.  The first 
virtual machine shall be used a base for snort alerts.  The second virtual machine shall be 
used with an HTTP filter and snort to test port filters in combination with a tool.  The 3rd 
virtual machine will be counting ssh packets without a filter, the 4th virtual machine will be 
counting ssh packets with port 22 being filtered.   
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4.3.1 Network for beta test 
The network for the beta is similar to the network for the alpha test only more 
systems will be online for the test.  Figure 10 below shows a view of the network and where 
the Host Os server will be listening and thus where the experiment virtual machines will be 
listening.   
 
Figure 11. Beta test network 
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Blue teams (defense) networks will have a ftp, web, remote desktop, and cvs server 
running on their networks.  There are approximately 14 blue team networks each with its 
own IP range and network traffic.  All out bound and inbound traffic to a team’s network get 
routed through the ISEAGE Internet Scale Event Attack Generation Environment cluster, and 
then copies of those packets were dumped out to a hub in which the tap interface of the host 
Server will be listening on.     
Red teams (attack) network consist of many different IP address ranges in which any 
machine connected to the network can acquire an address in any of the provided IP ranges.  
This is the attacker’s network, where all official attacks on the Blue teams will come from.  
All out bound and inbound traffic to the red team network get routed through the ISEAGE 
cluster, to the appropriate location and then copies of those packets were dumped out to a 
hub in which the tap interface of the Host Server was listening on. 
The Green (everyday users) network is to simulate users that access services from 
outside the firewall of a team.  All traffic is routed through ISEAGE and a copy of the traffic 
is based out to the hub that the Host Server is listening on.   
All contest traffic is copied and then seen by the host server for the experiment virtual 
machines to run their tools on.  This contest is using vlans to manage traffic which some 
organizations use and will test the ability to work on a network with vlans.     
4.3.2Virtual machines for beta test 
The Beta test consisted of four virtual machines; each virtual machine network 
interface was bridged to the host machines network interface that is listening at the TAP 
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point.  There will be ebtables in place; this test is to look at the performance, packet loss, to 
test whether or not the traffic is seen by the virtual machines, and to see if the ebtables is an 
effective way to do packet filtering.  So in this test it appears as if all experiment virtual 
machines are directly listening on the tap interface. 
Experiment Virtual Machine 1 will be designed to get a baseline of results for running 
snort on a virtual machine during the contest.  Since during the attack phase multiple snort 
alerts should be generated.  The physical server is limited by memory constraints, so the 
virtual machines are limited by ram constraints.  The virtual machine’s ram limit will be set 
to 512 megabytes of RAM, the “lowmem” option of snort needs to be enabled.  20 minutes 
after the contest is scheduled to end the virtual machine shall copy the snort result log over to 
its /results directory.  The virtual machine operating system will be Ubuntu 8.10 server with 
as few features installed as possible.   Snort was then installed and configured start at boot 
and listen on the virtual machines network interface.  Then the virtual machine’s network 
device was configured statically to have no IP address and be in promisc mode.  In this mode 
the interface listens to all inbound traffic.     
Experiment Virtual Machine 2 was designed to compare a virtual machine with a 
filter in front of it to a baseline of results for running snort on a virtual machine during the 
contest.  Since during the attack phase multiple snort alerts should be generated, this virtual 
machine will have a filter on the interface to prevent http traffic (port 80) from reaching the 
interface and thus the snort alerts generated off of port 80 will not be seen.  The physical 
server is limited by memory constraints, so the virtual machines are limited by ram 
constraints.  The virtual machine’s ram limit will be set to 512 megabytes of RAM, the 
“lowmem” option of snort needs to be enabled.  20 minutes after the contest is scheduled to 
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end the virtual machine shall copy the snort result log over to its /results directory.  The 
virtual machine operating system will be Ubuntu 8.10 server with as few features installed as 
possible.   Snort was then installed and configured start at boot and listen on the virtual 
machines network interface.  Then the virtual machine’s network device was configured 
statically to have no IP address and be in promisc mode.  In this mode the interface listens to 
all inbound traffic.     
 Experiment Virtual Machine 3 is designed to gather baseline data about the traffic 
that the interface sees.   The virtual machine operating system will be Ubuntu 8.10 server 
with as few features installed as possible.  The virtual machine will be running a custom 
libpcap application designed to keep track of the total number of Ethernet, ARP, ICMP, http, 
and SSH, packets seen. SSH and HTTP will be monitored by the looking for source and 
destination ports of 22 or 80 respectively.  The application will be configured to start at boot 
and listen on the virtual machines network interface.  Then the Virtual machine’s network 
device will be configured statically to have no IP address and be in promisc mode.  In this 
mode the interface listens to all inbound traffic. 
Experiment Virtual Machine 4 is designed to gather data about the traffic that the 
interface sees, with a filter in place.   The virtual machine operating system will be Ubuntu 
8.10 server with as few features installed as possible.  The virtual machine will be running a 
custom libpcap application designed to keep track of the total number of Ethernet, ARP, 
ICMP, http, and SSH, packets seen. SSH and HTTP will be monitored by the looking for 
source and destination ports of 22 or 80 respectively.  The application will be configured to 
start at boot and listen on the virtual machines network interface.  There will be a filter in 
place to block SSH (port 22) traffic from reaching the virtual machine.  Then the virtual 
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machine’s network device will be configured statically to have no IP address and be in 
promisc mode.  In this mode the interface listens to all inbound traffic. 
4.3.3 Traffic recorder 
In addition to the NEMESIS Node, another machine will be listening at the same 
point as the NEMESIS node to record all network traffic seen.  This is so that a test can be 
conducted on the use of TCPReplay to replay the traffic back to the virtual interfaces, and see 
if the same results are achieved.   
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CHAPTER 5.  CONCLUSION 
NEMESIS is a system level approach to collecting and using private trace data that 
has been historically hard to gain access to.  Nemesis is a framework that allows researchers 
to build their experiment with the tools they need, and with the only restrictions being, disk, 
processor and ram usage.  Nemesis allows researchers to build their experiments it also 
allows for policy to be enforced by the trace data owner.  The policy can be enforced on the 
type and quality of data that the researcher’s experiment virtual machine sees.  The policy 
also comes in to play on what data and results the researcher is allowed to take out of the 
network.  The system level approach allows for a security n depth model.  
5.1 Successes 
Using a virtual machine as the experiment benefits the researcher and the 
organization.  The researcher benefits because they can use multiple tools running on their 
experiment virtual machine and correlate the results as opposed to previous solutions that 
require the researchers to quarry a database, and or write their applications in a custom 
programming language.  The organization benefits from a security in depth model instead of 
a basic on layer of anonymization.  Trace data anonymization can be seen as security through 
obscurity which has long been seen as a bad approach, in anonymization of trace data, Pang 
proved that this was the fact when he reversed the network topology [Pang 4].  
Anonymization of trace data can be seen as one layer to help protect the organization private 
information. The NEMESIS solution allows for firewall rules to prevent some traffic from 
reaching the virtual machines, it also allows for some control over what results leave the 
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organization, to help prevent against future attacks and network topology leaks.  The use of 
virtual machines also means that the experiments can be restricted from the network as a 
whole and be isolated, so that they can not affect the network.   The system allows for most 
of Saltzer’s and Schroder’s design principles.   
Principle of least privilege is the principle that says that objects and subjects should 
have sufficient privileges to do what they need to do and nothing more.  When using virtual 
machines the experiment runs as a virtual machine, but the user that launches the virtual 
machines determines the access rights of the virtual machine on the host machine.  This 
allows for the ability to restrict access and privileges on the host OS.  Principle of fail-safe 
defaults means deny all by default and allow rights and privileges as needed.  In the case of 
the virtual machines they need privileges to /dev/tun, nut do not need access to a lot of other 
host OS devices.  Principle of economy of mechanism is reached by having a simple virtual 
machine framework that experiments are just deployed to and then the solution uses the 
existing network devices to handle network traffic to prevent over complicating things. 
Principle of open design is achieved by publishing the frame work and using open source 
software in the implementation.  Principle of separation of privilege is achieved by the policy 
management system to restrict the results that leave along with the traffic that it sees.  
Principle of least common mechanism depending on virtual machine implementation this can 
be achieved.  If the virtual machines’ disks are held on a cloud style NAS then the disk arrays 
and read covert channel is removed, if there is enough RAM in the machine then that will be 
removed, but there is always some common mechanisms like hardware buffers that are 
always shared.  Principle of psychological acceptability is achieved due to fact that 
researchers have the ability to build a VM and have control over the disk image of the 
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experiment and the organization has control over the hardware and results that leave there 
network. 
5.2 Limitations 
This Solution is not without its limitations.  Currently the filtering is not capable to do 
deep packet inspection on packets and filter based on that, however with more work this may 
be possible.   
Currently the policy management of results is checked by hand and not by an 
automated system.  While using one way network taps, the system would need to join the 
network traces before replaying it on to the interfaces.  Virtual machines are limited by size, 
RAM, and CPU, so the total number and what is doable with the virtual machines are 
determined by how much of the physical assets are allocated to the virtual machines. 
Another limitation for the system is that the trace data is not published, so every time 
the researcher wants to run another experiment has to reach an agreement with the 
organization in order to gain access to the data again.  If the researcher is listening to a live 
network feed then he cannot reproduce the test since the trace is not recorded.   
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CHAPTER 6.  FUTURE WORK 
There are areas that could benefit from future work.  The system needs to be tested 
with recorded trace data replayed over the virtual interface.  The system needs to be tested 
with recorded anonymized data played over the virtual interface.   
The Policy management piece of the system could be expanded and fully 
implemented so that it can be automated, including anonymizing data sets and replaying 
them to a given virtual interface, and filtering those data sets based on the policies set forth 
on what the experiment virtual machine can see. 
Some of the networking utilities might benefit from a custom kernel module that is 
different than a bridge; this would work with the policy manager so that the data sets might 
be pushed to two virtual interfaces at the same time.     
Since in the case of the test the researcher and trace owner was the same the policy 
negotiations were not test and need to be tested.   
 40 
 
APPENDIX A.  BRCTL HELP 
  brctl –addbr <bridgename> -- creates a bridge interface 
  brctl –delbr <bridgename> -- deletes a bridge interface 
  brctl –addif <bridgename> <interface name>-- adds an interface to a bridge interface 
  brctl –delif <bridgename> <interface name>-- deletes an interface to a bridge 
interface 
revised 
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APPENDIX B.  KVM HELP 
The following is an excerpt from the man page of QEMU and are used in the test system for 
more information please view the full man page written by Fabrice Bellard. 
 
           You can connect a CDROM to the slave of ide0: 
 
                   qemu -drive file=file,if=ide,index=1,media=cdrom 
 
           If you don’t specify the "file=" argument, you define an empty 
           drive: 
 
                   qemu -drive if=ide,index=1,media=cdrom 
 
 
           By default, interface is "ide" and index is automatically 
           incremented: 
 
                   qemu -drive file=a -drive file=b" 
 
           is interpreted like: 
 
                   qemu -hda a -hdb b 
 
       -boot [a|c|d|n] 
           Boot on floppy (a), hard disk (c), CD-ROM (d), or Etherboot (n). 
           Hard disk boot is the default. 
       -localtime 
           Set the real time clock to local time (the default is to UTC time). 
           This option is needed to have correct date in MS-DOS or Windows. 
 
 
       Display options: 
 
       -nographic 
           Normally, QEMU uses SDL to display the VGA output. With this 
           option, you can totally disable graphical output so that QEMU is a 
           simple command line application. The emulated serial port is 
           redirected on the console. Therefore, you can still use QEMU to 
           debug a Linux kernel with a serial console. 
 
       -vnc display[,option[,option[,...]]] 
           Normally, QEMU uses SDL to display the VGA output.  With this 
           option, you can have QEMU listen on VNC display display and 
           redirect the VGA display over the VNC session.  It is very useful 
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           to enable the usb tablet device when using this option (option 
           -usbdevice tablet). When using the VNC display, you must use the -k 
           parameter to set the keyboard layout if you are not using en-us. 
           Valid syntax for the display is 
 
            
 
       Network options: 
 
       -net nic[,vlan=n][,macaddr=addr][,model=type] 
           Create a new Network Interface Card and connect it to VLAN n (n = 0 
           is the default). The NIC is an rtl8139 by default on the PC target. 
           Optionally, the MAC address can be changed. If no -net option is 
           specified, a single NIC is created.  Qemu can emulate several 
           different models of network card.  Valid values for type are 
           "i82551", "i82557b", "i82559er", "ne2k_pci", "ne2k_isa", "pcnet", 
           "rtl8139", "e1000", "smc91c111", "lance", "mcf_fec" and "usb".  Not 
           all devices are supported on all targets.  Use -net nic,model=? 
           for a list of available devices for your target. 
 
       -net tap[,vlan=n][,fd=h][,ifname=name][,script=file] 
           Connect the host TAP network interface name to VLAN n and use the 
           network script file to configure it. The default network script is 
           /etc/qemu-ifup. Use script=no to disable script execution. If name 
           is not provided, the OS automatically provides one. fd=h can be 
           used to specify the handle of an already opened host TAP interface. 
           Example: 
 
                   qemu linux.img -net nic -net tap 
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APPENDIX C.  MOUNT SCRIPT 
mount –t ext3 –o loop, offset=32256 /path/to/image  /mnt/point 
cp /mnt/point/results results/vm# 
 
 Very basic setup guide 
1) Install OS (in guide ubuntu server 8.10) 
2) In installation select only to have ssh server option not virtualization.  
3) When done installing verify you can ssh into the server, go to a location and ssh. 
4) Run commands 
a. sudo apt-get update 
b. sudo apt-get upgrade 
c. sudo apt-get install kvm xserver-xorg-core uml-utilities ebtables gcc g++ 
python build essential vncviewer gcj ethtool wireshark kpartx 
5) verify that you can use x-forwarding over ssh if you are ssh in. 
6) kvm-img create –f raw diskname.img size{numberM, number G}  
7) recompile tunctl from source and copy into /usr/sbin/   
http://sourceforge.net/project/showfiles.php?group_id=233549 
8) sample network creation deletion script customize for your bridge needs 
a. Script 
#!/bin/bash 
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# id of the user running qemu (kvm) 
USERID=0000 
 
# number of TUN/TAP devices to setup 
NUM_OF_DEVICES=5 
 
case $1 in 
        start) 
                modprobe tun 
  ifconfig eth1 0.0.0.0 
                echo -n "Setting up bridge device br0" 
                brctl addbr br0 
                ifconfig br0 192.168.100.254 netmask 255.255.255.0 up 
                for ((i=0; i < NUM_OF_DEVICES ; i++)); do 
                        echo -n "Setting up " 
                        tunctl -p -b -u $USERID -t qtap$i 
                        ifconfig qtap$i 0.0.0.0 promisc up 
                done 
  brctl addif br0 qtap0 
################# 
#  tap  
################# 
  brctl addbr brtap0 
                ifconfig brtap0 up 0.0.0.0 promisc 
  brctl addif brtap0 eth1 
  brctl addif brtap0 qtap1 
  brctl addif brtap0 qtap2 
  brctl addif brtap0 qtap3 
  brctl addif brtap0 qtap4 
        ;; 
        stop) 
                for ((i=0; i < NUM_OF_DEVICES ; i++)); do 
                        ifconfig qtap$i down 
#                       brctl delif br0 qtap$i 
                        tunctl -d qtap$i 
                done 
                ifconfig br0 down 
  brctl delif br0 qtap0 
                brctl delbr br0 
################# 
#  tap  
################# 
  ifconfig brtap0 down 
  brctl delif brtap0 eth1 
  brctl delif brtap0 qtap1 
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  brctl delif brtap0 qtap2 
  brctl delif brtap0 qtap3 
  brctl delif brtap0 qtap4 
  brctl delbr brtap0 
 
        ;; 
        *) 
                echo "Usage: $(basename $0) (start|stop)" 
        ;; 
esac 
9) Download the iso of the os you want to install 
10) Build image kvm start command 
a. kvm –hda /path/to/disk –cdrom  /path/to/iso/or/cdrom/device –m amount \ 
 –boot d –net nic, macaddr=SomeValidMac. Model=e1000 \ 
–net tap, ifname=NetworkInterfaceName, script=no –localtime 
 
11) Start image for setup /develop image 
a. kvm –hda /path/to/disk –m amount – boot c \ 
–net nic, macaddr=SameValidMac. Model=e1000 \ 
–net tap, ifname=NetworkInterfaceName, script=no –localtime 
12) Start for deploy 
a. kvm -vnc none –hda /path/to/disk –m amount – boot c \ 
–net nic, macaddr=SameValidMac. Model=e1000 \ 
–net tap, ifname=NetworkInterfaceName, script=no –localtime 
13) mount –t ext3 –o loop, offset=32256 /path/to/image  /mnt/point 
cp /mnt/point/results results/vm# 
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